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ABSTRACT 
 
Corruption, Shadow Economy and Income Inequality: 
Evidence from Asia* 
 
A number of recent studies for Latin America show that as the size of the informal economy 
grows, corruption is less harmful to inequality. We investigate if this relationship is equally 
compelling for developing countries in Asia where corruption, inequality and shadow 
economies are considerably large. We use Panel Least Square and Fixed Effects Models for 
Asia to find that both ‘Corruption Perception Index’ and ‘ICRG’ index are sensitive to a 
number of important macroeconomic variables. We find that in the absence of the shadow 
economy, corruption increases inequality. However, with larger shadow economies in South 
Asia, the income inequality tends to fall. 
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1. Introduction 
A series of important recent studies for the Latin American countries (Dobson and 
Ramlogan-Dobson, 2012a, b; 2010) show that corruption is less harmful to income 
inequality when the presence of informal sectors in such countries is factored in.  These 
papers argue that the economic reasons behind the moderating effect of corruption on 
inequality are primarily two-fold.  On the one hand, the institutional weaknesses in 
developing countries per se lead to growth and persistence of informal sector that in turn 
employs a large number of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.  The growth of the 
informal sector is interpreted as an offshoot of economic reform.  Reform demands 
greater compliance and adherence to stringent regulations from formal institutions 
thereby raising their cost and eventually pushing them to informal production and 
employment arrangements.  On the other hand, the existence of corrupt regimes in a 
country tends to distribute jobs and projects that would not be there in less corrupt 
regimes.  This also leads to more employment opportunities for those who would be 
otherwise unemployed.  These factors cushion the adverse effect of reforms on income 
inequality depending on the spread and depth of the informal sector.  In fact, a large 
number of studies analytically substantiate that the fact that growth of informal sector is 
largely influenced by economic reforms and corrupt governance (for example, Ulyssea, 
2010; Dabla-Norris, 2008; De Soto, 2000; Dixit, 2004; Marjit, 2003; Marjit, Ghosh and 
Biswas, 2006, etc).  
Since South and Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa and large parts of 
developing Asia all suffer from development deficits, considerable corruption and high 
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incidence of shadow economies, it should be interesting to find out if evidence for Asia is 
as compelling as that reported for Latin America.  Presently, we offer a detailed panel 
data analysis for 19 countries in Asia between 1995-2008 to observe the possible linkages 
between corruption and inequality, both being reportedly high under acceptable indices. 
To this end, we use Panel Least Square and Fixed Effects Model in the presence of the 
shadow economy to find that both ‘Corruption Perception Index’ and ‘ICRG’ index are 
sensitive to a number of important macroeconomic variables.  These include, schooling at 
secondary and tertiary levels, size of the service sector, degree of trade openness, final 
public consumption expenditure, demographic distribution, etc. We also use a south 
Asian dummy to examine the impact of corruption on income inequality in the presence 
of large shadow economies – a predominant feature of south Asian countries. We find 
that, in the absence of the shadow economy corruption increases inequality.  However, if 
the shadow economies in the South Asian countries are bigger, the income inequality 
tends to fall.  More generally, we find that corruption increases income inequality in 
developing countries of Asia.  In addition, the higher incidence of corruption leads to 
higher inequality in South Asian countries and the presence of large shadow economies 
reduces income inequality even if corruption rises at the margin.  The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the available literature and section 3 offers 
methodology and data in adequate detail.  Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 
concludes.      
 
2. Literature Review 
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Available evidence suggests that corruption and the size of the informal sector are 
complements or substitutes and may depend on the individual or aggregate income levels 
(e.g., Dutta, Kar and Roy, 2011; Dreher and Schneider, 2010; Friedman et al., 2000; 
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998, etc). While cross-country interest on this 
issue is not uncommon, region-specific or country-specific evidence is relatively scant.  
Moreover, the evidence centers mainly on the ‘informal sector’, while some of these 
countries also host relatively large illegal economies generally termed as the ‘shadow 
economy’.  It is plausible that the dampening, and therefore unexpected (since most 
papers show that corruption raises inequality, such as, Ades and Di Tella, 1997; Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2002; Gyimah-Brempong and Munoz de Camacho, 2006; 
Li, Xu, and Zou, 2000, etc.) impact of corruption on inequality may or may not remain 
valid if one extends the concept of the informal sector to the shadow economy.  Note that, 
the shadow economy includes activities that are often criminal, unreported, unrecorded, 
illegal or at least ‘informal’.  However, Schneider (2005) in this and several other studies 
suggest that the subject remains controversial mainly owing to a lack of uniformity in the 
definition adopted globally and the new innovations that keep adding to the complex 
maze of illegal activities.  It is therefore not automatic that the expansion of the shadow 
economy dampens the level of income inequality in the same manner as one 
contemplates with growth of the informal economy. The extra-legal dimensions of the 
shadow economy are capable of cornering resources and raise inequality in contradiction 
to what has been argued generally.  Therefore, the issue lends itself to empirical 
verification as we offer presently.  The evidence of participation in the shadow economy 
in Asia is particularly compelling (for example, Chaudhuri, Schneider and 
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Chattopadhyay, 2006 for India) and therefore it is natural to develop an econometric 
model for estimating the impact of corruption on inequality in the presence of sizable 
shadow economies.  Recently Dutta, Kar and Roy (2012) study 20 Indian states to 
empirically show that higher corruption increases level of employment in the informal 
sector. Further, it shows that for higher levels of lagged state domestic product, the 
positive impact of corruption on the size of the informal sector is nullified. 
Overall, these results are not unexpected since the shadow economy employs 
large number of people, works as a buffer and sustains livelihood.  Nonetheless, the 
question of causal link, whether corruption leads to shadow economy or the pre-existing 
shadow economy leads to corrupt practices hints at the problem of endogeneity.  We use 
instrumental variables such as life expectancy and military expenditure at the country-
level to check for the robustness of these econometric models and indicate that it is the 
corruption in the aggregate that leads to growth and persistence of the shadow economy 
lowering income inequality as a consequence.   
 
3. Model, data and methodology  
In order to estimate the impact of corruption on inequality in the presence of 
shadow economy the model is structured as follows: 
tititititititi XSECPISECPII ,,,,3,2,10, *     (1) 
where, I is a measure of income inequality, CPI is corruption, SE is shadow economy and 
X is a vector of explanatory variables used by most cross-country inequality studies 
capable of explaining a significant portion of the variation in income inequality. These 
include: log real GDP per capita (lnRGDPPC), government final consumption 
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expenditure as a share of GDP (GFC), gross secondary school enrollment rate (SchoolS), 
gross tertiary school enrollment rate (SchoolT), share of service sector in total output 
(Service), exports plus imports as a share of GDP (Open), average of political rights plus 
civil liberties (Demo).1  Further, δ is vectors of coefficients, ɛ is the error term and 
subscripts i represents country and t is time. 
The coefficient β3 captures the interaction effect of corruption and shadow 
economy on inequality, which is the main focus in this study. In addition, the partial 
effects of corruption and shadow economy on inequality are computed as follows: 
 
ti
ti
ti SE
CPI
I
,31
,
,  

                                                  (2a) 
ti
ti
ti CPI
SE
I
,32
,
,  

     (2b) 
 
Equation (2a) is the marginal impact of corruption on inequality when the shadow 
economy is included in the model. If 03  , and the absolute value exceeds 01  then 
equation (2a) implies that a one percentage point increase in corruption yields a negative 
impact on inequality as the size of the shadow economy increases.  Conversely, if 03   
corruption increases inequality if the shadow economy grows with it.  This is essentially 
the interaction term between corruption and shadow economy, which is the main focus of 
our analysis and therefore should be explained in detail. Stated alternatively, equation 
(2a) tests if the rise in corruption translating into a rise in the size of the shadow economy 
lowers income inequality.  Similarly, equation (2b) is the marginal effect of shadow 
                                                 
1 The reasons behind inclusion of these variables are discussed in Reuveny and Li, 2003; Gyimah-
Brempong and Munoz de Camacho, 2006 and Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011, for example. 
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economy on inequality in the presence of corruption.  If 03   and exceeds 02  then 
a one percentage point increase in the size of the shadow economy lowers inequality if it 
also leads to more corruption in the system.  
The analytical basis for the relationship in (2a) is direct. If the prevalence and rise 
in corruption leads to development of the shadow economy it should create certain 
economic opportunities in a country that would not otherwise exist.  These opportunities 
manifest themselves into income generating activities among workers and entrepreneurs 
in the shadow economy lowering inequality in response.  Note that, the activities within 
the shadow economy undoubtedly stay outside the formal system and are mostly 
unreported.  The activities do not generate tax revenue (but may generate bribes for 
sustaining an extra-legal system explaining the marginal effect in 2b) and is not factored 
in the growth accounting.  Although there is gross underreporting in consumption 
expenditures as captured via census, activities in the shadow economy cannot be fully 
suppressed either physically or in terms of household data.  Since unemployment benefit 
and other social security transfers are fairly minimal for these countries (see Tzannatos 
and Roddis, 2000 for global data on welfare transfers), sustaining a livelihood for poor 
people is often dependent on activities in the shadow economy and it is captured in 
various country-specific sample surveys, such as National Sample Survey (NSS) in India.            
Next, we examine the relationship between corruption and inequality in the South 
Asian countries using the interaction term of corruption (CPI) and South Asian dummy 
(DSA) using equation (3). 
tititititi XDSACPIDSACPII ,,,32,10, *     (3) 
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Differentiating equation (3) with respect to corruption shows the marginal impact of 
corruption as: 
DSA
CPI
I
ti
ti
31
,
,  

      (4) 
Once again, 3 is the interaction term between corruption and inequality when the relation 
is tested for countries in South Asia alone (as a sub-set of developing Asian countries). 
The coefficient suggests that corruption increases inequality in south Asian countries 
(more) compared to non-South Asian countries. We expect γ3 > 0 and (γ1 + γ3) > 0. 
Subsequently, we incorporate the shadow economy variable to examine the role 
of informal sector in the South Asian countries.  This is modeled as: 
 
titititititititi XSECPISEDSACPIDSACPII ,,,,5,4,32,10, **        (5) 
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to corruption estimates the marginal impact of 
corruption on inequality in the presence of shadow economy as: 
ti
ti
ti SEDSA
CPI
I
,531
,
,  

    (6) 
If the shadow economy plays a crucial role in reducing inequality in South Asian 
countries, then γ5 < 0 and the absolute value of γ5 should exceed (γ1 + γ3). In other words, 
the marginal impact of corruption is less positive and may become negative as the size of 
the shadow economy increases.  
The empirical model is estimated on the basis of a sample of developing countries 
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in Asia.2 Our dependent variable is inequality, which is measured by Gini coefficient. 
Data on Gini coefficient is drawn from the United Nations World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER, 2008).3 The subjective index of corruption is used as a 
principal measure, collected from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI).4 The CPI index is a composite index based on individual surveys from 
various sources. For simplicity and ease of exposition, the CPI has been converted into a 
scale from 0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt).  Note that, we also use International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index for robustness check. It should be pointed 
out that both CPI and ICRG have been criticized for biases and are not completely free 
from errors.  However, these are still the best data sets available for cross-country studies. 
In this regard, it is important to remind the reader that inequality has several sociological 
and psychological impacts on the people. For example, You and Khagram (2005) find 
that inequality increases perceived corruption.  Thus, the perception-based indicators may 
already have factored in effects of inequality.  The ICRG index is rescaled in the same 
manner as the CPI. Data for other explanatory variables are obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators 2010 and Freedom House. Data on the shadow 
economy is drawn from Schneider (2007). The shadow economy is measured in terms of 
percentage of ‘official’ GDP. Shadow economy data from Schneider (2007) are the most 
comprehensive estimates obtained using unified method and have been used in many 
other studies (e.g., Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2012 and Layoza, Ovied and Serven, 
2005). Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of all variables included in the study. 
                                                 
2 Countries included in the sample are: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, 
Jordon, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
3 See http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ for details. 
4 See http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview for details. 
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[Table 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to estimate the impact of corruption on inequality, our benchmark model 
(equation 1) is estimated with panel least square (PLS) and fixed effects (FE). Use of FE 
model is advantageous because it can control for unobserved time-invariant country-
specific effects. Instrumental variable estimation is used for addressing potential 
endogeneity. Following Chong and Calderon (2000), government military spending as a 
percentage of GDP is used as potential instrument for corruption. We also use life 
expectancy as another instrument for corruption.5 We test the instrument validity by 
using Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions. Wald test is used to determine the 
significance of independent variables and the instrumental variables explain the mutual 
causality between corruption and income inequality. 
 
4. Results 
The regression fit of the scatter plots of GINI and CPI in Figure 1 suggests a 
positive relationship between Gini coefficient and corruption. In other words, higher 
levels of corruption are associated with higher levels of inequality.  Figure 2 shows that 
an increase in the size of the shadow economy is associated with higher levels of 
corruption. On the other hand, Figure 3 illustrates that large shadow economy increases 
inequality in the developing countries of Asia. 
 
                                                 
5 Corruption can have impact on life expectancy as Mauro (1998) points out that more corrupt government 
spends less on health and education. Correlation between life expectancy and corruption is 0.25. As life 
expectancy cannot directly affect income inequality but may affect indirectly via corruption. 
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[FIGURE 1 to FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The estimated panel results for the relationship between inequality and corruption 
are presented in this section. First, we focus on the results of CPI and then re-estimate the 
results using ICRG index. The next section presents results using two-stage least squares 
(TSLS) followed by the regression analysis for the South Asian countries. The model 
diagnostics provide no case for concern and all models indicate a good fit to the data. 
Table 2 reports panel least square and fixed effect results of estimating equation 
(1). CPI is used as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows that corruption coefficient 
is positive and significant at 1 percent level indicating that an increase in corruption 
increases the Gini coefficient i.e. income inequality. This supports the conventional view 
that corruption is indeed deleterious for inequality. The positive SE coefficient in column 
(2) suggests that the shadow economy by itself significantly increases inequality in the 
Asian countries. However, the interaction effect of SE and CPI on inequality is negative 
and significant. The interaction effect (column 3) of shadow economy on inequality at the 
mean score of corruption of 5.899 is 0.623, which is statistically significant at 1% level. 
It suggests that a one-point standard deviation increase in shadow economy increases 
income inequality by 6.56 points at the mean CPI score of 5.899. However, the impact of 
shadow economy shows some mixed results at different levels of corruption. If a country 
is less corrupt, then a high share of shadow economy is associated with greater inequality. 
But if a country is highly corrupt then the existence of a large shadow economy reduces 
inequality.  These empirical findings appropriately describe the theoretical conjectures 
discussed in section 3.   
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
  
The interaction effect of corruption on inequality at the mean SE score of 
27.925% is 1.452. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in corruption index 
increases inequality by 3.52 points, or 0.68 standard deviations in the Gini coefficient at 
the mean SE score. The result indicates that the interaction effect of corruption has a 
significant impact on increasing inequality given an average sized shadow economy. 
However, the interaction effect of corruption is not always positive. It produces both 
positive and negative effects on inequality in the polar cases. The partial effect estimates 
(following Saha et al., 2009) the shadow economy and corruption interaction at various 
levels of SE starting from 10% to 70% of the GDP share and the results are reported in 
Table 3. For example, the estimated coefficient of 1.859 of the interaction term at SE = 
10% indicates that when the shadow economy is rather small, an increase in corruption 
increases inequality. In contrast, when the shadow economy is quite large (i.e. SE = 70% 
of GDP) a one-unit increase in corruption reduces inequality by 9.270 points. The 
threshold point of SE is reached between 10% and 20% of GDP share. Thus, corruption 
increases inequality when the level of shadow economy is very small.  As a country 
crosses the threshold greater corruption decreases inequality with larger shadow 
economies. This result indicates that the shadow economy alters the relationship between 
corruption and inequality.  For Asia, this conforms to the Latin American studies by 
Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010) and Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson (2011).  
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Columns (4) and (5) estimate the impact of openness on inequality in the presence 
of corruption and the results show that globalization increases inequality at the mean 
score of corruption in the Asian countries. This result is valid even in the presence of 
shadow economy (column 5). Control variables such as log GDP per capita, tertiary 
school enrollment and share of service sector to GDP show negative signs.  This indicates 
that a higher level of income per capita, tertiary enrollment and service sector reduces 
inequality. Note that, coefficients for government consumption expenditure, secondary 
school enrollment and democracy are positive suggesting that higher levels of each of 
these factors increase inequality.  This further implies that the countries are unequal to 
begin with and new resources generated via public expenditure, democracy and access to 
education are cornered by a few exacerbating income inequality in the process.      
   Fixed effects (FE) results are in columns (6)-(10) of Table 2. These results are 
consistent with the panel estimates. In particular, the shadow economy coefficient is 
positive but not significant, the coefficient on corruption is positive and significant, and 
the corruption-shadow economy coefficient is negative and significant. The results 
support the view that the impact of corruption on inequality depends on the size of the 
shadow economy. In the absence of shadow economy, corruption increases inequality 
and it falls as the shadow economy expands. Furthermore, if the economy is more ‘open’ 
(as measured by the degree of trade openness) it increases inequality for the most corrupt 
countries in Asia. We also estimate the random effects and the results remain same.6  
                                                 
6 The results are not reported here and available on request.  
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ICRG Index 
For the next step, we estimate equation (1) using ICRG index for perception of 
corruption and results are very similar to that of CPI (Table 4). The previous results show 
that a significant partial correlation between corruption and inequality exists, along with 
other control variables. However, Gini coefficient is likely to increase corruption and the 
OLS estimation may overestimate/underestimate the corruption impact on inequality.  
Finally, we use the instrumental variables (IV) approach to investigate a causal 
relation between corruption and inequality. Life expectancy and military expenses as a 
percentage of GDP are used as instruments for corruption. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We show that these variables perform remarkably well from a statistical point of 
view. The model passes the Sargan test in all cases (Table 5) suggesting that both military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP and life expectancy are good predictors of 
corruption. The TSLS estimates confirm the results of the PLS estimations (Table 2), that 
a higher level of corruption is significantly associated with higher inequality. In addition, 
the interaction effects result for CPI and SE is also consistent with the PLS results. This 
finding is robust and provides strong evidence that higher corruption unambiguously 
increase inequality in the developing countries in Asia. Moreover, the shadow economy 
alone increases inequality in the most corrupt countries of Asia. 
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[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The estimated results of the SA dummy however, show that South Asian countries 
are more equal than the rest of the developing countries in Asia (Table 6). The estimated 
coefficient of South Asia dummy is negative and highly significant (columns 20 and 21). 
The results clearly indicate that the problem of inequality is less serious in South Asian 
countries, compared to the other regions. However, corruption increases inequality more 
in South Asian countries. The results in column (22) of Table (6) show that the marginal 
impact of corruption in South Asian countries is 1.413 + (1.810*1) = 3.223 and while for 
the non-South Asian countries it is 1.413. In other words, a one unit rise in corruption 
(CPI) leads to a rise in the Gini coefficient by approximately 3.2 in South Asian 
countries. If the ICRG measure of corruption is used, the marginal impacts are small i.e. 
Gini coefficient rises by 0.17 (column 23). The results illustrate that more corruption 
increases inequality in South Asian countries to a greater extent. It should be interesting 
to point out that South Asian countries are more equal than other countries in Asia but 
corruption makes them more unequal. 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Columns (24) and (25) estimate the interaction effects between corruption and SA 
dummy and corruption and SE, based on equation (5). Corruption-shadow economy 
interaction term is negative and significant indicating that the marginal impact of 
corruption decreases as the informal sector becomes larger. For example, a country with 
average size of informal sector of 28% of GDP the marginal impact of CPI on inequality 
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is 4.809 + 0.032*1 – 0.183*28 = -0.283.  Thus, a one-point rise in corruption (CPI) 
decreases the Gini coefficient by 0.283. For ICRG measure of corruption, the marginal 
impact on inequality is much greater (-2.149) for the average size of shadow economy. 
Interestingly, in the absence of the shadow economy corruption increases inequality but 
large shadow economy in South Asian countries tend to reduce the income gap between 
the rich and poor. This echoes the result reported in Table 3. The marginal impacts of CPI 
(ICRG) on inequality for the average size of shadow economy for the list of Asian 
countries are shown in Table 7. The results illustrate that except India, CPI decreases 
inequality due to the existence of large shadow economy in South Asian countries. For 
ICRG index magnitudes of the negative effects are much stronger for South Asian 
economies indicating that large size of shadow economy helps reducing the income gap 
even when corruption increases. 
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 Democracy in poor countries is often a rather problematic choice, but is the only 
political, social and economic first best.  The share of problems that the poor countries 
face owing to the nature of governance can be vexing at times.  Economic inequality, 
high degrees of informality and large shadow economies are persistent features of the 
global South.  In addition, the spread and depth of corrupt practices in most of these 
countries has created conditions whereby free and fair economic activities have often 
moved to the backseat.  Along with it, the enforcement mechanisms usually function 
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poorly both due to lack of resources to monitor and due to certain strategic choices made 
by the government. The governmental failure in creating ‘formal’ economic opportunities 
often becomes a source of discontent among the governed. To pacify political unrest, the 
government strategically avoids monitoring and confrontation with extra-legal activities 
unless particularly forced by formal lobbies to do so.  We make an effort to measure 
whether a connection can be established between the degree of corruption faced by 
economic agents in the poor countries of Asia and the level of income inequality 
prevailing in respective countries. 
 We generated data for a set of 19 countries in Asia to see if corruption as 
measured by the perception indicators (Transparency International) leads to greater 
income inequality in these countries given the share of the shadow economy.  As reported 
previously for Latin American countries, we too find that beyond a share of 30% of the 
GDP coming from the shadow economy the level of inequality falls with corruption.  It 
should be noted that, existence of shadow economies or large informal sectors do not 
necessarily lead to more equity in income distribution.  Large shadow economies often 
lead to cornering of resources and extreme exploitation of workers who do not make it to 
the thin formal sector, where standard rules and regulations apply.  The present set of 
results suggests that income distribution in the presence of a shadow economy is not so 
dismal when corruption influences growth of such economies. The present data set does 
not allow us to explore whether the rule of law is further a product of deliberate misuse of 
governance as discussed above, or whether it is a product of the structural deficiencies at 
the country level which hinders growth and development of more formal businesses.  
While this may be a topic of related research in future, presently we find that the handful 
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of south Asian countries show lesser degrees of income dispersion when the interaction 
with the corruption perception is not taken into account.  However, the effect becomes 
negative (meaning lower inequality) and significant, when the share of shadow economy 
interacts with the corruption indicators.  This suggests that the spread of the shadow 
economy in the south Asian countries may have raised earnings among individuals and 
groups who otherwise would remain unemployed.  The comparable ICRG corruption 
index has been used as a check for the results based on Transparency International.  It 
seems that the results continue to be unidirectional in most cases, implying that a rise in 
the level of corruption lowers inequality via expansion of the shadow economy.   
It should be clarified finally that we have reported results from a partial 
equilibrium exercise, where income inequality is the only variable of interest.  It is self-
explanatory that explosion of corrupt behavior and the deepening of the shadow economy 
in a country are far from desired policies that a social planner concerned with economic 
inequality may consider adopting.  Although more corruption leads to lower income 
inequality by allowing activities in the shadow economy as we see both from a cross-
section and a panel, but this cannot be the conscious choice for governments in power.  
We also cannot ignore the economic trade-off that these countries continue to make.  
Strong economic and political tension exists between extra-legal activities, lower growth 
and lower inequality and these are posed against economic growth via proliferation of 
formal economy where rules are much more stringent.  It depends on the political choices 
made by these sovereign countries, as to which would be the acceptable path in future.                               
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 GINI CPI ICRG GDPPC SCHOOLS SCHOOLT GFC DEMO OPEN SE 
 Mean  39.441  5.899  6.184  8182.803  74.460  27.236  14.033  4.081  102.189  27.925 
 Median  38.400  6.600  6.250  1640.862  77.146  21.885  12.309  3.333  80.344  25.500 
 Maximum  50.600  10.000  8.500  40837.27  111.236  103.559  33.012  10.000  460.471  54.100 
 Minimum  29.000  0.600  2.500  122.095  27.709  2.559  4.364  0.001  0.309  13.100 
 Std. Dev.  5.171  2.425  1.439  11419.80  21.371  19.896  6.361  2.875  88.426  10.530 
 Skewness  0.244 -0.466 -0.443  1.353 -0.292  1.438  0.983  0.323  2.084  0.926 
 Kurtosis  2.117  2.118  2.705  3.474  1.997  5.270  3.211  1.911  7.253  2.963 
 Observations  392  392  374  329  250  246  321  392  331  60 
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Table 2 Inequality, corruption and shadow economy: Income Inequality as the dependent variable 
 PLS (1) PLS (2) PLS (3) PLS (4) PLS (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE (9) FE (10) 
CPI 1.433*** 
(4.241) 
-0.108 
(0.018) 
3.714** 
(2.109) 
1.549*** 
(5.887) 
5.211*** 
(5.758) 
0.741*** 
(3.600) 
-2.003*** 
(15.687) 
9.756*** 
(4.471) 
0.204 
(0.736) 
-4.681*** 
(14.148) 
LnGPPPC -0.127 
(0.504) 
-2.879*** 
(2.776) 
-1.617 
(0.917) 
-0.399 
(0.929) 
-8.470*** 
(9.134) 
10.174*** 
(4.549) 
-41.310*** 
(4.633) 
-6.550 
(1.520) 
9.643*** 
(4.896) 
-39.049*** 
(2.896) 
GFC 0.205*** 
(4.076) 
-0.206 
(1.047) 
-0.564* 
(1.993) 
0.220*** 
(5.308) 
0.856*** 
(3.211) 
-0.032 
(0.549) 
-0.769** 
(3.608) 
-0.123** 
(3.289) 
-0.042 
(0.897) 
-1.891*** 
(4.141) 
SchoolS 0.030*
(1.683) 
0.278*** 
(26.764) 
0.305*** 
(4.717 
0.043** 
(1.962) 
0.431*** 
(13.490) 
0.056** 
(2.339) 
-0.377*** 
(9.634) 
0.198 
(1.394) 
0.076*** 
(3.282) 
-0.342*** 
(8.080) 
SchoolT -0.064*** 
(4.757) 
-0.047 
(2.860) 
-0.175 
(1.717) 
-0.057*** 
(3.542) 
0.149*** 
(4.773) 
0.022 
(1.033) 
-0.076 
(1.531) 
0.008 
(0.243) 
0.043* 
(1.694) 
-0.013 
(0.096) 
Service -0.104*** 
(5.304) 
-0.129 
(1.043) 
0.073 
(0.562) 
-0.132*** 
(3.509) 
-0.617*** 
(4.226) 
0.124*** 
(2.942) 
-0.321*** 
(4.255) 
0.069 
(0.401) 
0.162*** 
(3.986) 
-0.203* 
(2.489) 
OPEN 0.057*** 
(11.835) 
0.022 
(1.072) 
-0.014 
(1.068) 
0.068*** 
(10.516) 
0.421*** 
(6.755) 
0.005 
(0.596) 
0.022 
(0.782) 
0.047* 
(1.933) 
-0.040** 
(2.414) 
-0.490*** 
(5.517) 
DEMO 0.719*** 
(4.695) 
-0.692 
(1.007) 
-0.854 
(1.568) 
0.751*** 
(5.177) 
 
0.673 
(1.127) 
-0.030 
(0.344) 
2.727*** 
(21.220) 
-0.407 
(0.890) 
-0.028 
(0.347)  
0.399 
(1.092) 
Shadow  0.300*** 
(5.291) 
1.714*** 
(3.965) 
 0.309*** 
(6.652) 
 0.506 
(1.702) 
2.750*** 
(7.838) 
 -0.024 
(0.072) 
Shadow*CPI   -0.185*** 
(3.110) 
    -0.363*** 
(5.200) 
  
CPI*OPEN    -0.003 
(1.167) 
-0.061*** 
(6.660) 
   0.007*** 
(3.173) 
0.054*** 
(5.955) 
Constant 24.075*** 
(4.779) 
46.666*** 
(3.166) 
6.974 
(0.237) 
25.829*** 
(4.002) 
38.135*** 
(6.630) 
53.888*** 
(2.985) 
415.184*** 
(5.928) 
-2.903 
(0.050) 
-49.698*** 
(3.093) 
433.505*** 
(4.203) 
Adjusted R2 0.355 0.562 0.679 0.354 0.660 0.936 0.992 0.990 0.938 0.992 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 180 27 27 180 27 180 27 27 180 27 
Countries 19 11 11 19 11 19 11 11 19 11 
Absolute t-statistics appear in parentheses with white heteroscedasticity corrected standard. ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 3 Impact of corruption on inequality at different size of shadow economy 
Informal sector income share % of GDP Impact of CPI on GINI at income share= 10%, 20%,....... 
10% 1.859 
(1.438) 
20% 0.004 
(0.004) 
30% -1.851* 
(1.903) 
40% -3.706*** 
(2.883) 
50% -5.561*** 
(3.174) 
60% -7.415*** 
(3.253) 
70% -9.270*** 
(3.270) 
Absolute t-statistics appear in parentheses with white heteroscedasticity corrected standard. ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4 Inequality and corruption using ICRG’s Corruption index  
 FE (11) FE (12) FE (13) FE (14) FE (15) 
ICRG 0.247 
(1.096) 
-0.939*** 
(20.521) 
0.454* 
(2.243) 
0.157 
(0.443) 
-2.027*** 
(10.711) 
LnGPPPC 9.319*** 
(4.888) 
-81.156*** 
(4.834) 
-59.356** 
(3.907) 
9.403*** 
(4.944) 
-34.090 
(1.261) 
GFC 0.051 
(0.725) 
-2.549*** 
(18.525) 
-1.868*** 
(9.191) 
0.046 (0.636) -2.605*** 
(6.656) 
SchoolS 0.113*** 
(2.949) 
-0.467*** 
(11.163) 
-0.218** 
(3.995) 
0.108** 
(2.418) 
-0.469*** 
(6.451) 
SchoolT 0.006 
(0.237) 
0.486 
(1.821) 
0.320 
(1.216) 
0.002 
(0.082) 
0.317 
(1.086) 
Service 0.251*** 
(3.991) 
-0.365** 
(3.332) 
-0.218** 
(3.194) 
0.259*** 
(4.041) 
0.188 
(0.755) 
OPEN -0.005 
(0.436) 
-0.122*** 
(4.793) 
-0.071*** 
(5.569) 
-0.011 
(0.944) 
-0.250*** 
(3.943) 
DEMO 0.017 
(0.194) 
2.684*** 
(13.425) 
2.375*** 
(14.988) 
0.026 
(0.284)  
1.745** 
(2.930) 
Shadow  0.343 
(1.123) 
0.358** 
(7.838) 
 1.163 
(1.535) 
Shadow*ICRG   -0.060*** 
(2.662) 
  
ICRG*OPEN    0.001 
(0.597) 
0.028** 
(3.100) 
Constant 56.790*** 
(3.156) 
707.635*** 
(5.726) 
519.940*** 
(4.627) 
-56.986*** 
(3.162) 
317.267 
(1.690) 
Adjusted R2 0.929 0.990 0.991 0.927 0.982 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 169 27 27 169 27 
Countries 18 11 11 18 11 
Absolute t-statistics appear in parentheses with white heteroscedasticity corrected standard. ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 5 Inequality, corruption and shadow economy: TSLS 
  (16)  (17) (18)  (19) 
CPI 1.212*** 
(2.989) 
9.671*** 
(3.542) 
1.329** 
(2.258) 
10.120*** 
(2.756) 
LnGPPPC -0.276 
(0.761) 
3.267 
(1.104) 
-0.794 
(1.026) 
-11.919*** 
(3.147) 
GFC 0.190*** 
(3.490) 
-2.231*** 
(4.067) 
0.213** 
(2.073) 
1.766** 
(2.549) 
SchoolS 0.035* 
(1.841) 
0.560*** 
(5.062) 
0.056 
(1.596) 
0.521*** 
(3.950) 
SchoolT -0.065*** 
(4.386) 
-0.707*** 
(3.884) 
-0.052* 
(1.649) 
0.287** 
(2.239) 
Service -0.115*** 
(6.969) 
0.886*** 
(3.032) 
-0.163*** 
(3.110) 
-0.983*** 
(3.238) 
OPEN 0.055*** 
(9.881) 
-0.068* 
(2.044) 
0.073*** 
(5.193) 
0.744*** 
(3.223) 
DEMO 0.711*** 
(4.265) 
-0.301 
(1.693) 
0.752*** 
(3.973) 
2.000* 
(1.798)  
Shadow  4.164*** 
(4.468) 
 0.300*** 
(3.445) 
Shadow*CPI  -0.514*** 
(4.186) 
  
CPI*OPEN   -0.004 
(1.430) 
-0.109*** 
(3.175) 
Constant 27.353*** 
(3.860) 
-98.147* 
(2.099) 
31.345*** 
(3.241) 
18.045 
(0.563) 
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.748 0.346 0.572 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 171 23 171 27 
Countries 19 10 19 11 
Instruments 9 11   
p-vlaue 
Sargan test 
0.526 0.238 0.206 0.233 
Absolute t-statistics appear in parentheses with white heteroscedasticity corrected standard. ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 6 Inequality, corruption and informal sector in South Asian countries 
 PLS (20) PLS (21) PLS (22) PLS (23) PLS (24) PLS (25) 
CPI 1.402*** 
 (4.220) 
 1.143*** 
(2.902) 
 4.809*** 
(4.692) 
 
ICRG  0.177 
(0.475) 
 0.072 
(0.168) 
 1.551 
(1.213) 
LnGPPPC -0.237 
(1.018) 
0.494 
(1.092) 
-0.541* 
(1.736) 
-0.606 
(1.201) 
-6.543*** 
(5.201) 
-4.019** 
(2.114) 
GFC 0.201*** 
(3.543) 
0.035 
(0.734) 
0.221*** 
(4.472) 
0.054 
(1.017) 
0.145 
(0.427) 
-0.163 
(0.541) 
SchoolS 0.001 
(0.067) 
-0.027 
(1.567) 
-0.0007 
(0.040) 
-0.024 
(1.291) 
0.534*** 
(10.468) 
0.401*** 
(3.818) 
SchoolT -0.072*** 
(5.080) 
-0.060*** 
(4.514) 
-0.067*** 
(4.623) 
-0.059*** 
(4.384) 
0.049 
(0.639) 
-0.079 
(0.853) 
Service -0.073*** 
(3.523) 
-0.093*** 
(4.261) 
-0.082*** 
(3.886) 
-0.103*** 
(3.996) 
-0.475*** 
(2.839) 
-0.257 
(0.838) 
OPEN 0.052*** 
(11.513) 
0.038*** 
(10.722) 
0.052*** 
(11.822) 
0.039*** 
(10.289) 
0.051*** 
(4.331) 
0.020 
(1.248) 
DEMO 0.782*** 
(4.671) 
0.591*** 
(3.241) 
0.809*** 
(4.910) 
0.628*** 
(3.222)  
-0.818* 
(1.803) 
-0.432*** 
(5.608) 
DSA -2.852*** 
(4.578) 
-3.098*** 
(4.101) 
-17.007*** 
(3.084) 
-9.963** 
(2.447) 
10.023* 
(2.027) 
5.801*** 
(4.067) 
Shadow     1.625*** 
(4.062) 
1.330** 
(2.602) 
CPI*DSA   1.810*** 
(2.468) 
 0.032 
(0.058) 
 
ICRG*DSA    0.100 
(1.594) 
 -0.542 
(1.286) 
CPI*Shadow     -0.183*** 
(3.566) 
 
ICRG*Shadow      -0.128* 
(1.945) 
Constant 26.615*** 
(5.545) 
43.374*** 
(10.368) 
30.709*** 
(5.322) 
44.603*** 
(9.270) 
26.787 
(1.386) 
35.867** 
(1.213) 
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.265 0.372 0.265 0.750 0.722 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 180 169 180 169 27 27 
Countries 19 18 19 18 11 11 
Absolute t-statistics appear in parentheses with white heteroscedasticity corrected standard. ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 7 Marginal impact of corruption on inequality for average size of shadow economy 
Country 
Average size of 
shadow economy (as 
% of GDP) 
Marginal impact of CPI 
on inequality for 
average size of SE 
Marginal impact of 
ICRG index on 
inequality for average 
size of SE 
Bangladesh  36.6 -1.8568* -3.6758* 
India 24.3 0.3941* -2.1014* 
Indonesia  21.36667 0.898899 -1.18393 
Iran  19.96667 1.155099 -1.00473 
Israel  22.86667 0.624399 -1.37593 
Jordon  20.5 1.0575 -1.073 
Kuwait  20.8 1.0026 -1.1114 
Malaysia  31.63333 -0.9799 -2.49807 
Oman  19.36667 1.264899 -0.92793 
Pakistan 37.8 -2.0764* -3.8294* 
Philippines  44.5 -3.3345 -4.145 
Saudi Arabia  19.06667 1.319799 -0.88953 
Singapore  13.4 2.3568 -0.1642 
South Korea  28.13333 -0.3394 -2.05007 
Sri Lanka  45.9 -3.5587* -4.8662* 
Taiwan  26.56667 -0.0527 -1.84953 
Thailand 53.36667 -4.9571 -5.27993 
UAE  27.1 -0.1503 -1.9178 
Yemen  28.3 -0.3699 -2.0714 
* indicates South Asian countries. 
 
 
Figure 1. Gini coefficient and corruption 
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Figure 2. Corruption and Shadow economy 
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Figure 3. Gini coefficient and shadow economy 
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